In a recent article for the “Journal of Happiness Studies,” he defied skeptics by insisting that the search for happiness can and should exist in the context of a public and political quest. The following is an abbreviated version of her article. It can be accessed in full at: http://www2.eur.nl/fsw/research/veenhoven/Pub2010s/ GreaterHappiness-JOHS-2.pdf The greatest happiness principle is well-known, and it is a standard subject in every introduction to moral philosophy. Yet the principle is seldom put into practice. Why is this? The answer to this question is also to be found in most introductory philosophy books: Utilitarianism is typically rejected, both on pragmatic and on moral grounds. How do these objections stand up to empirical tests? Below I will first consider the pragmatic objections and next the ideological qualms. I will draw on the empirical findings on happiness gathered in the World Database of Happiness

Pragmatic objections against the greatest happiness principle are many. It is useful to consider the evidence for and against for each of them.

The word happiness has different meanings and these meanings are often mixed up, which gives the concept a reputation for being elusive. Yet a “confusion of tongues” about a word does not mean that no substantive meaning can be defined. Let us consider what meanings are involved and which of these is most appropriate as a final policy aim. Enduring satisfaction with one’s life-as-a-whole is called ‘life-satisfaction’ and also commonly referred to as “happiness.” In my view, life-satisfaction is most appropriate as a policy goal

A common objection against the ‘greatest happiness principle’ is that happiness cannot be measured. This objection applies to most of the above-discussed meanings of the word, but does it apply to happiness in the sense of life-satisfaction? By definition, happiness is something we have on our mind and consequently we can measure happiness using questions. That is, simply asking people how much they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Questions on happiness can be posed in various contexts; clinical interviews, lifereview questionnaires and survey interviews. The questions can also be posed in different ways; directly or indirectly, and by means of single or multiple questions. Common survey questions

Because happiness can be measured with single direct questions, it has become a common item in large-scale surveys among the general population in many countries. A common question reads: “Taking all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you currently with your life as a whole?” Numeric values (1-to-10) are then expressed to measure “Dissatisfied” and “Satisfied.” Many more questions and answer formats have been used. All acceptable items are documented in full detail in the collection of “Measures of happiness,” which is part of the “World Database of Happiness’.” Though these questions are fairly clear, responses can be flawed in several ways. Responses may reflect how happy people think they should be rather than how happy they actually feel and it is also possible that people present themselves happier as than they actually are. These suspicions have given rise to numerous validation studies. I concluded that there is no evidence that responses to these questions measure something other than what they are meant to measure. Though this is no guarantee that research will never reveal a deficiency, we can trust these measures of happiness for the time being.

Research has also shown that responses are affected by minor variations in wording and ordering of questions and by situational factors, such as the race of the interviewer or the weather. As a result the same person may score 6 in one investigation and 7 in another. This lack of precision hampers analyses at the individual level. It is less of a problem when average happiness in groups is compared, since random fluctuations tend to balance. This is typically the case when happiness is used in policy evaluation. Still, the objection is made that responses on such questions are not comparable, because a score of 6 does not mean the same for everybody. A related qualm holds that is happiness a typical western concept that is not recognized in other cultures. Yet happiness appears to be a universal emotion that is recognized in facial expression all over the world and for which words exists in all languages. Consequently the non-response to question about happiness appears to be low all over the world. Summing up: Happiness as life-satisfaction is measurable with direct questioning and is well comparable across persons and nations. Hence happiness of a great number can be assessed using surveys.

Aiming at happiness for a great number has often been denounced as ‘illusionary’ because long-term happiness is a fantasy and certainly not happiness for a great number. This criticism has many fathers. In some religions the belief is that man has been expelled from Paradise: earthly existence is not to be enjoyed, we are here to chasten our souls. Classic psychologists have advanced more profane reasons. Freud (1929) saw happiness as a short-lived orgasmic experience that comes forth from the release of primitive urges. Hence he believed that happiness is not compatible with the demands of civilized society and that modern man is therefore doomed to chronic unhappiness. In the same vein, Adorno believed that happiness is a mere temporary mental escape from misery, mostly at the cost of reality control (Rath 2002). The psychological literature on ‘adaptation’ is less pessimistic, but it too denies the possibility of enduring happiness for a great number. It assumes that aspirations follow achievements, and hence concludes that happiness does not last. It is also inferred that periods of happiness and unhappiness oscillate over a lifetime and that the average level is therefore typically neutral. Likewise, social comparison is also seen to result in a neutral average and enduring happiness is only possible for a “happy few.” If all this is true, utilitarians can still go for the least possible unhappiness, but must miss out on the progress optimism from which the idea emerged.

Table 1 presents the distribution for responses to the 10-step question on life-satisfaction in the UK. The most frequent responses are 7, 8 and 9 and less than 10 percent scores below neutral. The average is 7.2. This result implies that most inhabitants of the UK must feel happy most of the time.

The high level of happiness is not unique to the UK. Table 2 shows similar averages in other western nations. In fact, average happiness tends to be above neutral in most countries of the world. So happiness for a great number is apparently possible. All this is in flat contradiction to Freudian theory, which predicts averages below 4 everywhere and also defies adaptation theory that predicts universal averages around 5. Summing up: Enduring happiness for a great number of people is possible.

The observation that most people can be happy does mean that they can be made happier by public policy. Like the wind, happiness could be a natural phenomenon beyond our control. Several arguments have been raised in support of this view. A common reasoning holds that happiness is too complex a thing to be controlled. In this line it is argued that conditions for happiness differ across cultures and the dynamics of happiness are of a chaotic nature, and one that will probably never be sufficiently understood. All this boils down to the conclusion that planned promotion of happiness is an illusion.

As in the case of “health,” conditions for happiness can be charted inductively using epidemiological research. Many such studies have been performed over the last decade. The results are documented in the earlier mentioned World Database of Happiness’ (Veenhoven, 2010). 

What does this research teach us about conditions for happiness?

Happiness research has focused very much on social conditions for happiness. These conditions are studied at two levels, at the macro level there are studies about the kind of society where people have the happiest lives and at the micro level there is a lot of research about differences in happiness across social positions in society. As yet there is little research at the “meso” level. Little is known about the relation between happiness and labor-organization, for example.

Table 2 we have seen that average happiness differs greatly across nations. People live happier in rich nations than in poor ones and happiness is also higher in nations characterized by rule of law, freedom, good citizenship, cultural “pluriformity” and modernity. Not everything deemed desirable is related however. Income equality in nations appears to be unrelated to average happiness and there is no relationship either between expenditures for social security and average happiness. The most affluent nations are also the most free and modern ones. It is therefore difficult to estimate the effect of each of these variables separately. Still it is evident that these variables together explain almost all the differences in happiness across nations, These findings fit the theory that happiness depends very much on the degree to which living conditions fit universal human needs (livability theory). They do not fit the theory that happiness depends on culturally variable wants (comparison theory) or that happiness is geared by cultural specific ideas about life (folklore theory).

Next to the above discussed studies on average happiness across nations, there is much research on differ ences in individual happiness within nations. A common theme in this kind of studies is the relationship between individual happiness and social position. Happiness is moderately related to social rank in western nations, while in non-western nations the correlations tend to be stronger. Happiness is also related to social participation and this relationship seems to be universal. Being embedded in primary networks appears to be crucial to happiness, in particular being married. This relationship is also universal. Surprisingly, the presence of offspring is unrelated to happiness, at least in present day western nations. These illustrative findings suggest that happiness can be improved by facilitating social participation and primary networks, in other words, by creating “social capital.”

Happiness depends not only on the livability of the environment, but also on the individual’s ability to deal with that environment. What abilities are most crucial? Research findings show that good health is an important requirement and that mental health is more critical to happiness than physical health. This pattern of correlations is universal. Intelligence appears to be unrelated to happiness, at least “school-intelligence” as measured by common IQ tests. Happiness is strongly linked to psychological autonomy in Western nations. This appears in correlations with inner-control, independence and assertiveness. As yet we lack data on this matter from Non-Western nations. Happiness has also been found to be related to moral conviction. The happy are more acceptant of pleasure than the unhappy, and they are more likely to endorse social values such as solidarity, tolerance and love. Conversely, the happy tend to be less materialistic than the unhappy. It is as yet unclear whether this pattern is universal. Summing up: Conditions for happiness can be charted empirically; the available data is already very informative.

These findings suggest that happiness can be advanced systematically. Public policy can create conditions that appear conductive to happiness, such as freedom, while therapy and education can foster personal characteristics such as independence. Yet these empirical data will not convince the critics who believe in a theory that holds happiness as immutable. Another theory holds that we are born either happy or unhappy and that policy interventions can change little as far as this is concerned. A collective variant of this theory is that happiness is a national character trait, for instance that Russian are chronically unhappy because of a cultural tradition of melancholy. This theory is also  wrong, follow-up of individuals show marked changes over the long-term and trend studies of nations show also profound changes, such as in Russia, where happiness dropped dramatically in the late 1990s after the Ruble crisis. Summing up: Happiness of the great number can be raised, just like public health can be promoted. At best there is an upper limit to happiness, analogous to the ceiling of longevity.

The fact that public happiness can be raised does not mean that happiness should be raised. Several arguments have been brought against this idea. Happiness has been denounced as trivial and as of less worth than other goal values and it has also been argued that happiness will spoil people. A main objection among philosophers is that the promotion of happiness may require objectionable means. Much of this criticism has been advanced in discussions about different concepts of happiness. The question here is whether these objections apply for happiness as life-satisfaction.

The value of happiness has been belittled in several ways, typically on the basis of faulty assumptions about the nature of happiness.

In his “Brave New World” Huxley (1932) paints a tarnished picture of mass happiness. In this imaginary model society, citizens derive their happiness from uninformed unconcern and from sensory indulgence in sex and a drug called ‘soma’. This is indeed superficial enjoyment, but is this enjoyment “happiness”? It is not. This kind of experience was classified as “pleasure” left-top in Table 2 and distinguished from “life-satisfaction” right-bottom. Happiness in that latter sense is more than mere pleasure; it last longer and involves an appraisal of one’s entire existence. It is also unlikely that passive consumer slaves, such as depicted in “Brave New World,” will be satisfied with their life-as-a-whole. Research shows that happiness is typically a fruit of active involvement and meaningful relations, while materialism appears to be associated with unhappiness.

It is commonly assumed that happiness depends on social comparison and that happiness is merely thinking to be better of than the Jones. If so, one can be happy with a miserable life, provided that the Jones are even less well off, or unhappy in heaven because the Jones are on a bigger cloud. The reader may remember that this theory also implies that greater happiness for a greater number is not possible since improvement of the living conditions for all will advance the Jones as much as you, leaving the difference the same. There is some truth in this theory. We are group-animals, hard-wired to seek social respect and this does often involve us in zero-sum games. Still, social respect is only one of several human needs and respect is not only gained by being better off. Consequently, the correlation between happiness and social status is not very strong, income, education and occupational prestige explaining less than 5% of the variance in happiness in modern nations.

Likewise it is assumed that happiness depends on the meeting of culturally determined standards of success, and that the happiness of present day Americans draws on their ability to live up to the models presented in advertisements. We met with this theory in the above discussion on whether greater happiness can be achieved, one of its implications being that shift in standards nullify the effect of progress. This theory equates happiness with cognitive contentment and misses the point that happiness depends more on affective experience, which draws on universal human needs. In this line research shows much similarity in conditions for happiness in nations all over the world. The case of corruption is an example; corruption lowers happiness everywhere, though there is much cultural variation in the acceptance of corruption. Likewise, marriage is not equally cherished in all cultures, but the married tend to be happier everywhere. Readers who have been raised with social constructionism may be reluctant to accept this. The following analogy may help them though: there is much cultural variation in likes and dislikes for food, e.g. the eating of pig meat. Still we all need the same nutrients and our health depends on that. Summing up: There are no good reasons to denounce happiness as insignificant.

Agreeing that happiness is desirable is one thing, but the tenet of utilitarianism is that happiness is the most desirable value. This claim is criticized on two grounds: firstly it is objected that it does not make sense to premise one particular value and secondly that there are values that rank higher than happiness.

Another strand of empirical research is survey studies on value preferences. Happiness ranks high in such studies, typically together with “health” that is also a manifestation of human thriving. There is a remarkable contrast between the valuation of happiness by the general public and the reservations about happiness among professional moralists, which is an interesting object of study in its own. Whatever the reason, this is a new fact that must be taken into account. Summing up: If one opts for one particular end-value, happiness is a good candidate. If not, happiness qualifies at least as a core value

Even if there is nothing wrong with happiness in itself, maximization of it could still work out negatively for other valued matters. Critics of utilitarianism claim this will happen. They foresee that greater happiness will make people less caring and responsible and fear that the premise for happiness will legitimize a-moral means such as torture of dissidents. This state of affairs is also described in “Brave New World,” where citizens are concerned only with petty pleasures and the government is dictatorial.

Over the ages, preachers of penitence have glorified suffering. This sermonizing lives on in the idea that happiness does not bring out the best of us. Happiness is said to nurture self-sufficient attitudes and to make people less sensitive to the suffering of their fellows. Happiness is also seen to lead to complacency and thereby to demean initiative and creativeness. It is also said that happiness fosters superficial hedonism and that these negative effects on individuals will harm society in the long run. Hence promotion of happiness is seen to lead to societal decay; Nero playing happily in a decadent Rome that is burning around him. Above I have argued that cognitive contentment is only one of the “components” of happiness and not the most important one. Another reason is that the critics of happiness (mostly philosophers) tend to have a blind eye for the functions of positive affect. As noted above, happiness signals adaptive success, and as such it also works as a go-signal. If an organism feels good, it knows that the cost is clear and that it can go ahead, whereas negative affect rather inhibits action. This view is supported in an emerging strand of empirical research on effects of happiness. The observed effects are typically positive: happiness fosters activity and facilitates involvement in tasks and in contact with other people. For instance: happy people tend to be better citizens, they work more, engage more in civic organizations and use their voting rights more carefully. There is also good evidence that happiness lengthens life. All this does not deny that happiness may involve some negative effects. There are for instance indications that happy people take more risk. Still the positive effects are clearly dominant. 

Conclusion: These empirical tests falsify all the theoretical objections against the greatest happiness principle. The criterion appears practically feasible and morally sound. Hence the greatest happiness principle deserves a more prominent place in policy making.